The management of firms in Democratic Republic of Congo is
broadly underestimated by the political leaders of this big and nice blocked up country of every sort and kind of natural resources,
so mining, oil as forested.
The major source of this underestimation or error of evaluation domiciles in creed that the institutions
of management or governance of firms support in priori to favor and to protect the interests of the propertied, of probably criminal
behaviors on behalf of the leaders. Since then, this fixed idea would enthrall especially the big firms quoted in grant titles of
which are often broadcast and direction of which is divergent of shareholding.
Of such big consortiums are rare where simply nonexistent
in Democratic Republic of Congo particularly and in the most part of the Africans countries. In the majority of situations, the anonymous
trusts are controlled by a small group of stockholders irreproachable and very close to leaders, while the markets of titles remain
narrow and practically devoid of liquid assets.
In the most part of the jobs performed in several Research centers and Development
as part of this mechanism of the governance, established the impact of the governance good of firm (good management of firm) for developing
countries, and supports that this subject of strengthening of the governance good does not interest, and constitutes not only thepanacea of the developed countries. On the contrary acquired results determine that the quality of the governance local good can vigorously
have an influence on the aptitude of a developing country to attain well supported growth rates. How to explain certain countries
notably in continental Europe after the second world war and Asia during 1960s in 1990, which knew hard high levels of growth in spite
of institutions of governance of probably negligible firm and pitiful quality?
It is the challenge which R.D.Congo must raise, because
the leaders or administrators of this country have to study fundamental and narrow interrelationship between the institutions of governanceof firm (private firms of interest public) of their dear country and its institutions of public governance. On this subject, the notion
of the culture of governance as that of political culture proves to be a mechanism principally of big importance, to understand the
capacity of the institutions of governance of a country to construct and to share trust, power and information across the society.
With
this small account which I introduce(present) you here, do not wait for you that I would give you resolutions in the problems of thegovernance in Democratic Republic of Congo. Resolutions are between consciences of the leaders of this country. My power limits itself
at the level of the expert advice and even if it means the administrators of this country to draw the twine, if they want it of course,
so that the illumination on the social life of the population is allowable.
As in the second Republic (Zaire), Mobutu had all Zairian intellectuals of high caliber in its sides and always nothing walked. Shall not we approve that, the photocopy of the third regime is really certified correspondent to the second? And who in his turn became the authentic original?
The absence of good institutions
of governance of firm, blocks its economic development
If we observe that an increase in productiveness constitutes a key agent of
economic development in the long term, then Asiatic miracle would not be absolutely improbable as much as affirmed it certain authors,
the growth in these countries would be advantage supported on a massive draft of the factors (financial, physical and human) of production
that on well brought up winnings of productiveness. Paradox would be solved due to the fact that such draft of the factors would not
be incompatible with a poor system of governance of the firms.
In the case of France which is also paradoxical, seems in spite of institutions
of governance of the firms there still located in contrast to norms of good governance today universally recognized, knew between
1945 and 1973 a period of strong, even speeded up and significantly called growth: « Glorious thirty ».
If we settled question to know
that, absence of good governance blocks and slows down economic development; answer would not come so easily, because it is very delicate
as question.
So support thesis that the quality of the institutions of governance of firm plays a preponderant role in the processes
of economic development can raise certain paradoxes. As named more high on the example of Asia from 1969s till 1990, in a context
which many people would describe without the slightest hesitancy pitiful governance of firm. See also the case of France.
The French
paradox, even judged in the alder of this criterion differentiating between (extensive) growths of production and (intensive) growth
of productiveness, French paradox, remains complete. The econometric analyses show that the growth of the Thirty Glorious leaned in
France on a strong increase in productiveness, while the system of governance of the firms remained very much distant of principles
of good governance fluently accepted there.
For those that are interested and wonder about the role of the governance of firms in the
processes of development, the experience of France is very rewarding and appears distinctly more appropriate than that of the United
States and United Kingdom, even if the Anglo-Saxon institutions provide main reference in the field. In effect, the institutions ofgovernance of French firm introduced until the recent period of characteristics closer to those of the most part of the developing
countries today.
1-A very strong concentration of the ownership of the capital, and especially the control of firms;
2-The absence of
true forces of opposition as long in internal that external in the firm;
3-A big permeability with the institutions of governance policy;
4-A
judicial power independence of which often leaves much to be desired;
5-strong executive powers, interventionists in economic material,
badly or barely controlled by the national Parliaments.
6-financial systems for a long time organized around the State or of banks
controlled by him, leading to markets of titles of size or liquidity restrained;
7-The importance of clan and family relations in the
organization of structures of governance of the firms;
8-social systems regulated in a predominating way by informal relations between
interests or groups of private interests.
Source: Studies of the Centre of development of the OECD.
All these elements are in contrast
to what would constitute a priori the foundation of healthy institutions of governance of firm, such as they conceive them in general
today.
Further to difficulties met by a certain number of big American conglomerates in 1970s, divergences of interests between stockholders-principals
and leaders-deputies made the object of a renewed attention. Certain authors even stressed the fact as if the leaders had as mandate
to maximize the benefit of the firm; they were as well disposed and capable to maximize theirs, to the detriment of that of the stockholders.
These last being the only investors from whom interests are not protected by contract in the firm; they run the risk of seeing their residual benefit
rolled by the stable of the leaders.
Where from definition specifies of institutions of governance of firm according to this approach:
« The governance of firm is interested in the way the investors of capitals in firms makes
sure a return on their investment .Comment are they sure that the leaders do not steal the provided capital or invest it in poor plans?
How do they control the leaders? » (Jensen and Meckling, on 1976).
Consequently, if a firm wanted to see diminishing the bonus of risk
demanded by the stockholders, it was necessary to him to give guarantees by the implementation of a panoply of mechanisms of control
(committees specialized within the directorate, audits, independent managers, market of the external control returning the real threat
of redemption, etc) and of instigation (supply options, bonus, etc) clean to line up the interests of the leaders on those of the
stockholders.
In spite of its influence in academicals circles, this analysis appears apparently marked by the institutional shape
which saw it being born, to know:
1-A broad dispersion of the ownership of the capital in the hands of comparatively passive investors,
on stock markets introducing a high degree of liquidity;
2-A net differentiation between leaders and stockholders;
3-The self-government
of the private sphere (financial institutions, firms, investors and markets of titles) in comparison with the State in the financing
of firms;
4-An independent judicial power capable of making respect rights of possession and private contracts.
This schema fits very
well to the Western institutions between them. But as for the institutions of governance of the firms met in the enormous majority
of the developing countries among which R.D.Congo and Africa in general, this schema is hardly applied and very badly. Nonetheless
Anglo-Saxon practices remain the most analyzing and the most using as a reference from a distance, so a big number of academicals
jobs on the governance of firm considers simply being knowledge existence or good functioning of a certain number of institutions
(notably those of external control) and underestimates their importance of this fact.
As a result firstly the practices of governanceof firm in developing countries are only partly and therefore very badly arrested by an approach to financial dominant feature focalized
on the only relations between leaders and stockholders.
Secondly, transformations in these practices obey only exclusively in formulated
recommendations, so much these last presuppose implicitly all or part imported frame of reference, itself existent of a long process
of institutional building and cultural impregnation.
The analysis of French paradox shows precisely that to be able to assess the impact
of the institutions of governance of firm on the developing country, as in Democratic Republic of Congo in the case which concerns
us here, it is necessary to take into account dynamics of institutional building and the culture of governance which model the presentations
of the actors and determine organizational forms.
According to several series of the recent jobs, stress
possibility, or even necessity, to enrich the analysis of the systems of governance of the firms by the incorporation of not exclusively
economic dimensions: lawful, historical and cultural.
The objective and intrinsic relation of the institutions of governance of firm
with all other founding institutions of the process of development (and notably the institutions of governance policy) seems empirically
justifiable. The idea of culture of governance is offered to return justice in this numerous influence which, in a given country,
is translated when all is said and done by the institutionalization of a system of governance of firm.
Following Oman (2003), we indicate
therefore by governance of firm:
« All the informal or formal, private and public institutions, including laws, codes and common practices
of the business world, which together determine relation between the leaders of firms (insiders) and all those who invest means there.
These investors can be purveyors of equity (equity capitals) (stockholders), debt (creditors), specific human resources (the wage
earners), or quite other active equipment or insubstantial firms of which will be able to have usage in their common operations and
their development. »
By this fact, of course, there would not be big interest to recommend the adoption of good practices or institutions
of governance deducted from those of advanced economy. In roughly, the governance good is not exported nor imports. In effect, initial
and local conditions imposed on the national trajectories postpone so much that they make almost «impossible and hardly transposable.
A French model of governance, transposition which would be all the less appropriate as France moved away from this model from 1970s
itself.
The analysis led across this study allows rather lighting the choices of the decision-makers of developing countries
by contributing to dispel the illusions the way the institutions of governance of firm of a country today developed were indeed built
and which role they played in its development.
References
- See Krugman (1994), and also Oman
and al. (2003).
- See Square and al, on 1972.
- See the report
Cadbury (1992) and the Principles of the OECD (1999).
- Al (on 1997 Carried it and, on 2000) assert
the importance of juridical tradition as main determiner of the national institutional choices: a very big number of developing countries
is considered as being recovering from a tradition of civil law, precisely from French origin (Napoleonic code says Civil code, dates
de1804) which, giving less than lawful protection than systems regulated by the nonpolitical (Common Law of Anglo-Saxon origin), would
encourage the investors not to remain minority but rather to acquire controlling blocks to be able to exercise a real influence on
the leaders. See Rajan and Zingales (2001) and Woo-Cumings (2001) for a good critical reading of this thesis.
- See Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama (1980) and Fama and Jensen (1983a, 1983b).
- See Frémond andCapaul (2002).
- To see Carried It and al. (1997), Licht (2001), Oman (2003), Roe (2002) and Stout
(2003).
- It appears that to ameliorate more in general our knowledge of the experiments of countries
developed in their diversity without giving in to myths could avoid a lot of wastings in developing countries. Experiments aborted
but costly of privatization or else installation of stock markets in certain countries in transition (Bulgaria, Lithuania, Macedonia)
or in development (Tanzania) are a good example. See Chang (2002) also: « We can and should draw lessons of history (in contrast with
the present state) of developed countries. So developing countries could draw an education of the experiments of countries developed
without having to pay all expenses generated by the development of new institutions. It is one of the rare advantages which there
are to be late (Latecomer). It is not negligible because once instituted, they soften more hardly institutions than policies. »
Definition of politics in the family
Here is the explanation of POLITICS:
One evening, in front of
the television, a child asks his dady: ' Papa, explain me what is politics '.
Answer of the dady: ' It is very simple,
my son. I am going to give you an example.
Let us take the case of our family:
It is me the dady who brings back
some money; I am the CAPITALIST.
Your mum manages this money; it is therefore the GOVERNMENT.
Your grandfather who lived
with us in the house, shone, proves if everything takes place well; there is therefore the PARLIAMENT.
The girl that you see
working in the house is our good; it, constitutes the WORKING CLASS.
All, us have only the only goal: guarantee your ease; you
are therefore the PEOPLE.
Your baby-brother still which sleeps easy in the cradle; we shall say that it is FUTURE. '
The child very well listened! The night falls, each leaves in the bed.
The child in sleep hears his baby-brother crying in the cradle.
It decides to get up, and to go to see. In fact, the baby-brother urinated in its linen!
That is to make? It wonders.
It goes to the room of his parents, and realizes that the mum is alone in the bed, and sleeps profoundly.
Very anxious, and not wanting to awaken it, the child goes to the room of the good,
And funnily, it finds his papa in
full rest of the warlike, in the bed of the girl.
Confused, the child is going to see the grandfather in his room,
who contents himself easily to look by the window, the stage of the girl and the papa.
Having been afraid and been disappointing
all at once, the child is going to go back to bed and falls asleep, letting the baby-brother cry.
The following day,
the papa asks proudly the child: ' Then my son, you reflected and understood what is
Politics? '
The child
answers: ‘Yes papa, your definition was too clear: Capitalism uses the working Class,
While the Government sleeps,
and the Parliament looks saying nothing.
They do it of what think of the People, and Future is in shit. '
What a wise child!